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ABSTRACT
Whereas research conducted in the existing EU member states show that people are not
receptive of the EU message, research in the Western Balkans has demonstrated that people in
this region might be more receptive to the EU message than previously known. We conduct an
experimental research design to observe the effects of the EU treatment on people’s willingness
to accept more Syrian refugees to settle in their countries and to allow Syrian refugees to travel
through their countries toward EU member countries. We analyze with a simple random sample
that combines data from a public opinion survey conducted in winter 2018-2019 via cellphone
in Albania and Kosovo. Our analysis shows inconclusive results, with the EU treatment
positively affecting attitudes toward allowing Syrian refugees to travel through the country
toward EU member countries, but it does not affect support for Syrian refugees to settle in the
country.
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1.INTRODUCTION
Whereas the bulk of literature on Europeans’ attitudes toward refugees and immigrants builds
on current European Union (EU) member countries, which are refugee and migrant destination
countries (Davidov and Meuleman, 2010; Huddleston and Sharif, 2019; Luedtke, 2005),
attitudes toward refugee and migration waves in EU membership aspiring countries from the
Western Balkans, which aspire to join the EU, have attracted far less attention (Peshkopia,
2005a, 2005b). How does people’s support for EU membership in EU membership-aspiring
countries along the Balkan Route of migration from the Middle East, Central and Southern
Asia and North Africa to Europe affect their attitudes toward refugees seeking to settle in those
countries or travelling through them toward EU member countries? Understanding Western
Balkans citizens’ attitudes toward migrants and refugees would be beneficially both from the
research and the policy perspective. First, the 2015 Europe’s refugees crisis exposed wide open
to the world differences in attitudes toward refugees and immigrants along the traditional
geopolitical divide of the continent, the East and the West (Keating, 2015; Peshkopia et al.,
2018; Pisarska, 2015). On the other hand, the Western Balkans still aspire to join the EU, and
the EU political message doesn’t go without notice among publics of those countries (Page,
2018). Therefore, one should expect that attitudes toward migrants and refugees in those
countries would reflect both Eastern Europeans’ reluctance toward accepting migrants and
refugees from poor countries outside the European continent, and people’s sentiments about
the EU and its norms and mores (Peshkopia et al., 2018). Second, since all of the Western
Balkans that aspire to join the EU are located on the Balkan Route, the land immigration route
from the Middle East to Central and Western Europe, studying such topic would benefit the
advantages of such settings, which allows to frame the problem both as a permanent domestic
problem and a transitory international problem. In transit countries located on the Balkan
Route, people could perceive the problem either/both as their own problem or/and as a problem
that would indeed belong to refugee destination countries. From a policy perspective, better
and deeper knowledge of determinants and correlates of public opinion on refugees and
migrants is important because public opinion might steer refugee-related public policies (Blitz,
2017; Böhmelt, 2019; Luedtke, 2005). This becomes even more important when refugeerelated policies in refugee transit countries affect both refugee-related policies in refugee
destination countries and refugee situation along transit routes (Moschopoulos, 2019).
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We apply an experimental research design dividing respondents in two groups and
asking the control group about support for Syrian refugees to settle in the country and support
for Syrian refugees to be allowed to travel through the country toward EU member countries;
and asked the experimental group the same question primed with an EU-related treatment. We
test our hypotheses with public opinion survey data that we collected in Albania and Kosovo
in winter 2018-2019. Observing the heterogeneous effects, we expect that the more people
support country’s EU membership, the more they think that EU membership conditionality
helps country’s democratization, and the more they support ethnic minority rights the more
they would be inclined to offer supportive responses toward Syrian refugees with the treatment
questions.
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2.LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 The 2015 Refugee Crisis and its Impact on Europeans’ Attitudes toward Immigrant
and Refugee
The 2015 refugee crisis refocused both academic inquiry and Eurosceptic concerns back at the
immigration issues. Even before the crisis, literature had argued about the relationship between
immigration and Europeans’ concerns about threats that immigration might pose to the cultural,
political and economic fabric of European societies. In spite of potential short-term economic
benefits, many European citizens perceive immigration as damaging to their societies
(Ivarsflaten, 2005; Quillian, 1995; Semyonov et al., 2006; Sides and Citrin, 2007). Concerns
about immigration would translate into growing opposition toward the EU, which they link to
open border policies and permissive attitudes toward immigration. In addition, some national
governments in Europe frame migration-related issues as European problems in order to divert
public attention from their own failures in the fields of migration and domestic integration
policy (Barbulescu and Beaudonnet 2014). This strong interlinkage of the two topics makes it
reasonable to expect an attitudinal link between sentiments toward immigrants and sentiments
toward the EU.
Building in the existing literature that links attitudes towards Immigrants with
Euroscepticism (de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007; Luedtke,
2005; McLaren, 2002), recent data have shown that the European refugee crisis increased
Europeans’ anti-immigrant sentiment and Euroscepticism, as well as the influence of
Europeans’ anti-immigrant attitudes on their level of Euroscepticism (Stockemer et al., 2019).
Arguably, the refugee crisis triggered a multifaceted crisis in the areas of governance, border
control, and unregulated migration to EU member states (Niemann and Speyer, 2018; Trauner,
2016). This shock has likely provoked fears toward immigrants and rejection of the EU in the
current EU member countries, as demonstrated by electoral results in Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Italy and Sweden as well as the results of the Brexit referendum (Peshkopia et al.,
2018; Stockemer et al., 2019). EU open border policies and its commitment to diversity trigger
growing anxiety among citizens generated by the threat that immigration represents to their
welfare and culture fuel Euroscepticism (Stockemer et al., 2019). Such sentiments were
exacerbated by some national governments’ inclination to frame the 2015 refugee crisis as an
EU problem.
Literature has shown attitudinal differences toward immigration between the European
East-West divide, among countries and individual characteristics (Koos and Seibel, 2019;
3

Peshkopia et al., 2018). Hence it is reasonable to ask the question: Do countries in the
Southeastern part of the continent make the same linkage between immigration and the EU
idea? Does the EU message affect people’s attitudes toward refugees in EU membership
aspiring countries of the Western Balkans? Research conducted in the current EU member
countries has shown that citizens in EU member countries are disinterested in the EU, and they
engage EU politics and asses them contingent of their country’s domestic politics (de Vreese
et al., 2006; Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Hix and Marsh, 2007; Hobolt et al., 2013; Tilley and
Hobolt, 2014; Weber, 2011). However, more recent research has shown that citizens of EU
membership-aspiring countries from the Western Balkans might be more mindful of the EU
message, as Page (2018) has demonstrated in the case of women rights in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Attitudes toward refugees might represent a more complex phenomenon, since
they might capture both an appropriation of European tolerance and welcoming toward
immigrants and refugees as well as concerns toward perceived or real cultural economic and
national security threats that immigrants and refugees bring along.
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3.ARGUMENT AND HYPOTHESES
European Union continues to represent an attractive project to the masses in the EU
membership aspiring countries from Balkans, that have a communist past and crave for the
country’s democratization. Though, a major part of the literature views and associates this
attraction toward European Union primarily with economic expectations (Gabel, 1998; Palmer
and Whitten, 1999; Tucker et al., 2011), we argue that the perception of the masses for
European Union in EU membership aspiring countries goes beyond financial aid and perceives
EU as an ally to the people in their quest for country’s democratization (Peshkopia, 2019).
Thus, when delivered, the EU message gets across very strongly and its impact shapes people’s
attitudes in the EU membership aspiring countries more than anticipated. But in what direction
does this impact go? Existing studies show that informational shortcuts are a key component
of political behavior in competitive democracies, because affiliations like one’s partisanship
affect how one perceives policies, and the institutions one blames for the condition of those
policies in a country (Brader et al., 2012; Druckman et al., n.d.; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998;
Tilley and Hobolt, 2011). In light of this, I argue that the more one supports country’s EU
membership, and agrees that the EU conditionality helps country’s democratization, and
supports ethnic minorities rights the more positive the response towards the EU’s message.
Therefore, we hypothesise as it follows:

Hypothesis 1.1: Priming survey question with EU support for refugee protection
increases support for Syrian refugees settling in the country.
Hypothesis 1.2: Priming survey questions with EU support for refugee
protection increases for Syrian refugees travelling through the country toward
EU member countries.
Hypothesis 2.1. The more people support their country’s EU membership, the
more they support Syrian refugees settling in their country.
Hypothesis 2.2. The more people support their country’s EU membership, the
more they support allowing Syrian refugees travelling through their country
toward EU member countries.

Literature has argued that EU membership conditionality is the most important policy tool that
the EU applies to countries that aspire to join the Union (Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003;
Dimitrova, 2004; Grabbe, 2006; Grabbe et al., 2003; Peshkopia, 2014). Ever since its inception,
5

EU membership conditionality has offered incentives, practical blueprints, financial support
and external justification for institutional and market reforms in the former communist Central
and Eastern European countries (Brusis, 2005; Grabbe, 2006, 2002; Grabbe et al., 2003;
Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2007; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier,
2004). On the one hand, the aggressively of EU membership conditionality policies and politics
has attracted criticism of unfairness toward EU applicants from former communist Central and
Eastern Europe, who are required to fulfill conditions disproportionately harsher and beyond
what other EU candidates have fulfilled (Grabbe, 2002, 1999; Grabbe et al., 2003). On the
other hand, empirical results have shown that citizens in the EU membership-aspiring Western
Balkans countries find with EU membership conditionality an ally that would force their
political elites to follow the course of reforms conditions by the EU (Peshkopia, 2020). Since
asylum and immigration policies have been part of the conditionality package that the EU has
sent to the EU membership countries from the Western Balkans (Peshkopia, 2005a, 2005b),
we expect that people’s attitudes toward refugees trying to settle or passing through the
Western Balkans countries toward EU member countries would reflect their attitudes toward
EU membership conditionality.

Hypothesis 3.1. The more people think EU membership conditionality helps
their country’s democratization, the more they support Syrian refugees settling
in their country.
Hypothesis 3.2. The more people think EU membership conditionality helps
their country’s democratization, the more they support allowing Syrian refugees
travelling through their country toward EU member countries.
Hypothesis 4.1. The more people think EU membership conditionality questions
country’s sovereignty, the less they support Syrian refugees settling in their
country.
Hypothesis 4.2. The more people think EU membership conditionality questions
country’s sovereignty, the more they support allowing Syrian refugees
travelling through their country toward EU member countries.
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3.1 The case studies: Albania and Kosovo
Albania

Both the situation of Albania in the Balkan Route and its contact with Syrian refugees
on the one hand, and Albania’s aspiration to join the EU and high support that EU
membership enjoys among the Albanian population makes the case of Albania a very
compelling one in trying to explain how support for the EU idea affect attitudes toward
immigration. Albania is situated on the Balkan Route of illegal migration from the
Middle East, Southern Asia and North Africa to Europe, especially the Western part of
the continent. During most of the second half of the Twentieth Century, Albania was a
self-isolated country, and migration from, to and through Albania did not exist. As
Albanian communist regime lost its steam by the end of 1980s, and collapsed, Albania
suddenly became an immigrant immigration country (King and Mai, 2013; Mai et al.,
2005). The economic and political turmoil of the 1990s weakened state’s control of its
borders, thus making Albania an immigrant transit country as well (Peshkopia, 2014,
2005a, 2005b). Similar to other Western Balkan countries, government’s efforts to
establish control of those borders, under severe EU membership conditions, managed
to establish asylum and immigration institutions and policies, and somewhat return
government control of country borders. However, all those efforts went to waste in
2015, when there were finally wrecked by Chancellor Merkel’s decision to invite
millions of Syrian refugees to the EU, through the Balkan Route (Connelly, 2016).
Dozens of underfed and visibly desperate Middle Eastern refugees now roam streets of
the Albanian capital city begging for food and involved in gang violence (Karaj, 2020).
Albania overthrew its communist system by late 1990, and immediately began
democratization and free market reforms. However, for the first time the country
elected an anticommunist majority only in 1992, which helped speeding up reform
pace, but also a political and economic reproaching with the EU; after all, then ruling
Democratic was founded by students and professors who led the Democratic Movement
in December 1990. However, the former communists who gathered around the newly
formed Socialist Party shared the same European aspirations with their political rivals,
thus making the Euro-Atlantic orientation (membership in the Council of Europe,
NATO and the EU) a policy without alternatives (Peshkopia, 2014).
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Due to its almost five decade-long isolation, the reformation process turned out
to be much harder than anticipated, as it was riffed with inherited underdevelopment,
policy failures, and intractable violent power struggle, which combined for a perpetual
state of political crisis, including cyclical electoral crises (Palickova, 2019). In 1992,
Albania and the EU signed a trade agreement, but the relationship developed slowly as
the EU turned its focus in absorbing larger and more developed former communist
Central and Eastern European countries. In the early 2000, Albania fell in the “Western
Balkans category,” a region which the EU designed to take a longer accession route.
Negotiation between Albania and the EU for a Stabilization and Association Agreement
(SAA) began in January 2006 and concluded in June the same year. The SAA entered
into force on 1 April 2009, and on 28 April 2009, Albania submitted its formal
application for EU membership. Until 2014, when Albania acquired the candidate
country status, the EU has rejected Albania’s application not once but twice (in 2010
and 2011), based mainly on the lack of progress in institutional reforms and a notorious
lack of willingness of opposing parties to cooperate on those reforms, and offered only
conditional candidate country in October 2013. During the following years, Albania’s
request to open accession negotiations have been denied several times, mainly due to
the resistance of France, Germany and, as always, the Netherlands, who both lacked
appetite for further enlargement without deeper integration and were taken off by the
Albanian relentless political crisis (Gray and Bariagazzi, 2019). Finally, in March 2020,
the European Council endorsed the opening of accession negotiations with Albania
(European Commission, 2020). Whereas it took an average of two years for other
countries to move from receiving the EU candidate status to opening accession
negotiations (Jano, 2018), over six years that it took Albania to undertake the step
witnesses about the difficulties that the country is experiencing in its EU accession
process.

Kosovo
Similar to Albania, both Kosovo’s exposure to the Balkan Route of illegal immigrants
and refugees from the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa toward the EU member
countries on the one hand, and strong support for EU membership among its population
this country and interesting case to observe the impact that the idea of Europe and its
norms exercise on attitudes toward refugees. Since 1989, when Serbia practically
8

absolved the substantial autonomy that the country enjoyed with the 1974 Yugoslav
Constitution, tens of thousands of Kosovo Albanians left the country during the 1990s
to seek refuge in Western Europe (King et al., 2010). A second migration wave
followed suit when some 800,000 Albanian Kosovar refugees were displaced my
Serbian security forces and paramilitaries during the 1999 NATO air campaign against
the Milošević’ regime (Barutciski and Suhrke, 2001; Williams and Zeager, 2004). A
third wave of emigration in the mid-2010s, when tens of thousands of Kosovar
youngsters and families took buses to the Western Europe, unhappy with country’s slow
economic growth and limited opportunities (Bytyci and Dunai, 2015; Bytyci and Than,
2015).
Also, Kosovo is located on the Balkan Route of Middle Eastern, South Asian
and North African illegal migrants and refugees trying to reach the EU territory. Similar
to Albania, Kosovo has managed to build some asylum capacities, which still remain
mainly untested, since the number of refugees travelling through Kosovo has been
limited. However, pools have pointed to a relatively large support among the Kosovo
population for refugees to settle in the country, mainly due to empathy with their own
situation a little more than two decades ago (Esipova and Ray, 2016; Krasniqi, 2015).
Kosovo was the last independent country to emerge from the ashes of former
Yugoslavia when, in 2008, it unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, which
controlled it from 1913 to 1999. The 78 days NATO air campaign against Serbian
security forces and paramilitaries ended the Serbian massacres against ethnic Albanian
civilians and ethnic cleansing. From 1999 to 2008, the region was administered by the
United Nation Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Since the first ethnic Albanian dominated
government took over in 2002, it expressed its commitment to pursue the EU
membership path through the Stabilization and Association Process (Rexhepi, 2004).
Finally Kosovo and the EU signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement in
October 2015 (Council of the EU, 2015), but country’s progress with the accession
process has stalled because its standing disagreements with Serbia.
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4. DATA AND METHODS
4.1 The Experiments
We applied an experimental research design because it helps to dissect the effect of the key
independent variable on the dependent variable. Also, our survey asked respondents in two
different ways consequentially, yet covering two different topics: support for Syrian refugees
to settle in the country and support for Syrian refugees to travel through the country. We rely
our research strategy on the existing consensus that research questions guide decisions about
research design and research methods (Bryman, 2007). Experimental surveys have shown that
changing survey question to account for voluntary and involuntary migration affected people’s
attitudes toward migrants and refugees (Verkuyten et al., 2018). Moreover, studies have shown
that people perceive immigrant groups differently (Mayda, 2004; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006).
For example, in Germany when people were asked about refugees the poll’s results showed
that two-third of the people agreed that accepting refugees was a national obligation (Dempster
and Hargrave, 2017). Also, when Ipsos MORI global data from 2016 stated that ‘most
foreigners who want to get into my country as a refugee really aren’t refugees, they found that
over half of those surveyed agreed (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017). Our research design makes
efforts to account for both the treatment effect and the role of contextualizing refugees between
settling in and travelling through the country.

4.1.1 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 randomly divides respondents in two groups, the experimental group (402
respondents) and the control group (385 respondents). We primed the question offered to the
experimental group with information related to the EU norms toward refugees. The purpose of
that specific priming is to remind respondents of the EU norms related to refugee rights, and
observe how that reminder would impact responses. The experimental and the control groups
received the following question, respectively:
Experiment 1: The European Union claims that admitting refugees is a European norm. How
much do you support the proposal that Albania/Kosovo should allow Syrian refugees to settle
in Albania/Kosovo?
Control 1: How much do you support the proposal that Albania/Kosovo should allow Syrian
refugees to settle in Albania/Kosovo?
10

4.1.2 Experiment 2
By the same token, Experiment 2 randomly divides respondents in two groups, the
experimental group (382 respondents) and the control group (391 respondents). Again, we
primed the question offered to the experimental group with information related to the EU norms
toward refugees. The purpose of that specific priming is to remind respondents of the EU norms
related to refugee rights, and observe how that reminder would impact responses. The
experimental and the control groups received the following question, respectively:
Experiment 2: The European Union claims that admitting refugees is a European norm. How
much do you support the proposal that Albania/Kosovo should allow Syrian refugees to travel
through its territory toward European Union countries?
Control 2: How much do you support the proposal that Albania/Kosovo should allow Syrian
refugees to travel through its territory toward European Union countries?

4.1.3 Data and Methodology
We test our hypotheses with a simple random sample of public opinion data that we collected
in Albania and Kosovo in winter 2018-2019 through the iziSurvey digital platform using the
cellphone random digit dialing (RDD) technique, specifically developed to overcome
telephone survey coverage bias in countries with uneven distribution of landline telephone
service (Mohorko et al., 2013; Peshkopia et al., 2014). A team of well-trained interviewers
conducted interviews on all the three major cellphone networks in the country, Vodafone,
AMC, and Eagle, which combined for 100% of the country’s cellphone users. In its 2018
Annual Report, the National Agency of Electronic and Postal Communication (AKEP) (2018)
stated that the penetration of landline telephony in Albania was only 8.6%, almost seven times
lower than Southeastern Europe regional average (40%) and almost twice as low as the world
average (15.2%), and even lower than developing country’s average (10%). Perhaps for that
reason, the number of cellphone users in Albania in 2018 was around 2.7 million (AKEP 2018),
whereas the total population of the country on December 31, 2018 was 2.862.427 (INSTAT,
2019). Such a deep penetration of cellphone in the Albanian telecommunication market offers
confidence that we reached a very good sampling frame. Our team of well-trained interviewers
conducted the interviews on three major cellphone networks in the country, Vodafone, AMC
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and Eagle which combined for 100% of the country’s cellphone market, 54%, 34% and 12%
respectively (AKEP, 2018).
We empirically test our hypotheses with data from our annual survey, The EU in the
Balkans 2018, conducted between December 21, 2018 and February 16, 2019, which asked
respondents about their general socioeconomic conditions as well as attitudes and opinions
toward mainstream political issues concerning the Albanian society. As a generic survey, it
lacks controversial questions related to sexual, drug and/or criminal behavior, therefore
providing a good testing set that minimizes interview breakoffs due to the socially tabooed
topics, and would allow a better observation of the effect of interviewer/respondent gender
dyad over the interview retention and length.
Because no eligible cellphone number list exists in Albania, interviewers conducted
RDD calls from a iziSurvey function that randomly selects a number within the number range
of each cellphone provider. About half of our call within the Vodafone Albania, about two third
with AMC and about none tenth with Eagle Mobile met numbers that were not assigned (voice
operator message “The number that you dialed does not exist”). According to the Albanian
cellphone usage habit, almost all those numbers that were not eligible (voice operator message
“The number you have called is not available at the moment”) either called us back or sent us
text messages to call them back. We performed one callback only to those few numbers who
did not contacted us back. We contacted 2863 individuals, and reached a total completion rate
of 40.34%, a numbers way higher than the usual 10%-20% repose rate that RDD cellphone
surveys achieve in the US (AAPOR, 2016; AAPOR Cell Phone Task Force, 2010).
We test these claims with a probability simple random sample of public opinion survey
data that we collected in Albania and Kosovo. We operationalized the dependent variables,
support for Syrian refugees to settle in Albania/Kosovo and support for allowing Syrian
refugees to travel through Albania/Kosovo toward EU member countries as responses much=3,
somewhat=2, little=1, and not at all=0. Also, for the sake of heterogeneous effects, we have
operationalized several independent variables, including support for country’s EU
membership, the belief that EU membership conditions help country’s democratization and the
belief that EU membership conditions question country’s sovereignty (much=3, somewhat=2,
little=1, and not at all=0). Also, we will consider the experiments’ heterogeneous effects of
support for refugee rights and beliefs that ethnic minorities represent a threat to country’s
sovereignty (Gelber and McDonald, 2006; Reed, 2010). Also, we analyze the heterogeneous
effects of some socioeconomic variables such as age, gender, education and religion, all
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thought to be relevant in explaining attitudes toward immigrants and refugees (Heath and
Richards, 2016; Jacobsen, 1996; Łaciak and Frelak, 2018).
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We begin with some descriptive statistics. On the left side of Figure 1 are histograms of value
distribution for support for Syrian refugees to settle in the country for both the experimental
and control groups, and on the right side is a bar chart of means of those attitudes for the
experimental and the control group. As the result show, priming the question with the refugeeprotection-as-an-EU-norm treatment brings about a slight increase in the mean support for
Syrian refugees to settle in the country. Comparing the histograms, the treatment causes a small
decrease in the “not at all” response, and small increases in the “little”, “somewhat” and
“much” responses.
Figure 1. Support for Syrian refugees to settle in the country by treatment and control
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Support for Syrian refugees
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Data source: The EU in the Balkans 2018 Survey

Figure 1. Support for Syrian refugees to settle in the country by treatment and control
On the left side of Figure 2 are histograms of value distribution for support for Syrian
refugees to travel through the country for both the experimental and control groups, and on the
result show, priming the question with the refugee-protection-as-an-EU-norm treatment brings
about an increase in the mean support for Syrian refugees to travel through the country.
Comparing the histograms, the treatment causes a decrease in the “not at all” response, and
increases in the “little”, “somewhat” and “much” responses.
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Figure 2. Support for Syrian refugees to travel through the country by treatment and control
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Figure 2. Support for Syrian refugees to travel through the country by treatment and control
Table 1 show the results for the t-test of support for Syrian refugees to settle in the
country by the experimental and control groups. As the results show, there is an increase of .09
in the mean support for Syrian refugees to settle in the country, the test does not produce any
statistical significance in order to eliminate randomness of such findings. Therefore, we do not
have enough evidence to claim that priming the question with EU norms would sway attitudes
toward more support for Syrian Refugees to settle in the country.

Table 1. T-test for Experiment 1

Table 1. T-test for Experiment 1
Group

Obs.

Mean

p

Std. err

Std. dev.

95% conf. interval

Experiment 1 402

1.28

.06

1.15

1.17

1.40

Control 1

385

1.19

.06

1.16

1.07

1.31

Combined

787

1.24

.04

1.16

1.16

1.32

.09

.08

-.07

.26

Difference

Note: * is for p<.05, ** is for p<.01, *** is for p<.001

Table 2 shows the results for the t-test of support for Syrian refugees to travel through
the country toward EU member countries by the experimental and control groups. As the results
show, there is an increase of .20 in the mean support for Syrian refugees to travel through the
country toward EU member countries, and the results are significant at the 99 percent
confidence interval. Therefore, there is enough evidence to claim that priming the question
with EU norms would sway attitudes toward more support for Syrian Refugees to travel
through the country toward EU member countries.
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Table 2. T-test for Experiment 2
Table 2. T-test for Experiment 2
Group

Obs.

Mean

p

Std. err

Std. dev.

95% conf. interval

Experiment 2 382

1.57

.06

1.17

1.45

1.19

Control 2

391

1.37

.06

1.17

1.25

1.31

Combined

773

1.47

.04

1.17

1.38

1.32

.03

.36

Difference

.20

**

.08

Note: * is for p<.05, ** is for p<.01, *** is for p<.001

Those findings highlight both the effect of the EU message and its limitations. The
results suggest that, when it comes to support settling of Syrian refugees in the country, the EU
message is mostly unable to sway people’s attitudes, whereas it could affect those attitudes
only in allowing Syrian refugees to travel though the country toward EU member countries. In
order to create a better idea of what effects the EU treatment wield on relevant determinants
and associations of attitudes toward Syrian refugees settling in the country or passing through
toward EU member countries we take a look at heterogeneous effects on experiment treatment
at country level, which also helps to highlight any country differences in those determinants
and associations. Figure 3 graphically represent the heterogeneous effects of support for
country’s EU membership, the belief that EU membership conditions help country’s
democratization, the belief that EU membership conditions question country’s sovereignty, the
belief that ethnic minorities threaten country’s sovereignty, support for human rights, age,
gender, years of education and religious affiliation.
As the results show, support for EU membership affects the treatment effect in opposite
directions for each country: whereas more support for country’s EU membership predicts
higher treatment effect in Albania, more support for country’s EU membership predicts lower
treatment effect in Kosovo. Therefore, the treatment effect seems to associate more with those
Kosovo citizens who support little country’s EU membership and more with those citizens of
Albania who support more country’s EU membership. Similar patterns appear also with the
belief that EU membership conditions help country’s democratization and the belief that EU
membership conditions question country’s sovereignty. For Albania, the association of the
belief that EU conditions help country’s democratization with the treatment effect produced an
almost flat line, whereas for Kosovo we observe a negative relationship of that association,
most likely because those who already hold much of such beliefs tend to remain intact, whereas
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it seems to associate more with those citizens of Albania who hold lower levels of belief that
EU membership conditions question country’s sovereignty. Also, considering ethnic minorities
as threatening the country tend to positively associate with the treatment effect, although the
relationship produces a very mildly growing line. Here, the association of such belief with the
treatment effects for Kosovo show a very small increase, showing that the treatment effect is
slightly associated with more fear of ethnic minorities as threatening country’s sovereignty,
whereas for citizens of Albania, it associates more with those who carry less of such fears. As
for supporting human rights, for Kosovo citizens, the treatment effect seems to associate more
with lower levels of support for human rights, whereas for citizens of Albania the association
carries the opposite direction.
In the case of socioeconomic variables, the data show a negative association between
the treatment effect and age for citizens of Kosovo and a positive association for citizens of
Albania. Also for gender, the association between treatment effect and gender goes in different
directions in both countries, with males in Albania showing no association with the treatment
effect whereas females showing lower association than males (negative association) with the
treatment effect, whereas in Kosovo the trend is reversed. And finally, the table shows that
none of the three major religion affiliations in both countries, being a Muslim, a Catholic or an
orthodox display any association with the treatment effect.

Figure 3. Heterogeneous effects; Experiment 1
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Figure 4 graphically represent the heterogeneous effects on the treatment of support for
country’s EU membership, the belief that EU membership conditions help country’s
democratization, the belief that EU membership conditions question country’s sovereignty, the
belief that ethnic minorities threaten country’s sovereignty, support for human rights, age,
gender, years of education and religious affiliation. The belief that EU membership conditions
help country’s democratization shows a negative association with the treatment effects in both
countries, whereas the belief that EU membership conditions question country’s sovereignty
shows a positive association with the treatment effects. Also, considering ethnic minorities as
threatening the country tend to positively associate with the treatment effect, although the
relationship produces a very mildly growing line. Support for human rights produces a negative
association with the treatment effect in both countries.

Figure 4. Heterogeneous effects; Experiment 2
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In the case of socioeconomic variables, the data show a mild positive association
between the treatment effect and age for citizens of Kosovo and a mild negative association for
citizens of Albania. Also for gender, the association between treatment effect and gender goes
in different directions in both countries, with females in Albanian showing lower association
than males (negative association) with the treatment effect, whereas in Kosovo the trend is
reversed. And finally, the table shows that none of the three major religion affiliations in both
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Other

Not affiliated

countries, being a Muslim, a Catholic or an orthodox display any significant association with
the treatment effect.
The heterogeneous effects showed a complex picture: first, in the case of attitudes
toward Syrian refugees settling in the country, the data showed no significant effect of the EU
treatment, whereas priming the question with EU norms affected the second experiment. The
limitation of the EU message’s effect confirms existing findings: citizens of Eastern European
countries, where the Western Balkans are a sub-region, continue to cling to their traditional
understanding of national sovereignty and the EU message could not sway their attitudes
toward settling Syrian refugees in their countries. Also, in line with extant literature, Western
Balkans’ citizens seem to view the Syrian refugee crisis as a European crisis, and positively
react to the EU message to allow Syrian refugees to travel through their countries toward EU
member countries.
Albeit ethnic similarities between populations of Albania and Kosovo (they are both
ethnic Albanians), and their similar reaction to the EU message related to allowing Syrian
refugees to travel through their countries toward the EU, citizens of Albania and citizens of
Kosovo do not respond alike to the EU treatment in allowing Syrian refugees to settle in their
countries. Much of such a difference might come due to the unsettle international status of
Kosovo, but also due to the fact that Kosovo is a new country, which increases its populations’
protective behavior toward national identity and homogeneity, thus making its less receptive
toward the EU message.
One of the major highlights of those findings is the lack of religion’s role in people’s
attitudes toward Syrian refugees, especially Islam. Simplistically Albania and Kosovo are
considered as Islamic countries, mainly due to their majority of Muslim population. However,
as one author has noticed, the low role that religion in general and Islam in particular plays in
the political and social relations among Albanians both in Albania and in Kosovo would better
consider most Muslim Albanians more as of Muslim origin than Muslims (Lederer, 1994). The
remarkable religious tolerance among Albanians has amazed and puzzled foreign authors and
politicians alike (Babuna, 2000; Young, 1999), but apparently has not helped much in changing
their perception of those countries, which continues to occasionally address them as Muslim
countries (Tanner, 2015). However, our data do not provide any evidence that religion in
general and particularly Islam play any role in people’s reaction toward the EU treatment.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis was an effort to understand and explain attitudes toward Syrian refugees in two
countries along the Balkan Route, Albania and Kosovo. Both countries share many similarities,
mainly due to their overwhelming majority of being ethnic Albanians, but some differences in
the realm of state formation processes. Our findings suggest that those differences might affect
differences in responding to the EU treatment effect with regard to allowing Syrian refugees to
settle in the country, but do not affect the EU treatment in allowing Syrian refugees to travel
through the country toward EU member countries. Therefore, the EU message seems to have
its limitations even in countries that aspire to join the EU. Moreover, controversies that
emerged among the Western EU countries and their Central and Eastern European counterparts
seem to extend also among the Western Balkans countries that aspire to join the EU: their
publics seem not to share the same enthusiasm as the Western European elites and publics in
admitting Syrian refugees in their countries, even when they are told that this is a European
norm. People still appreciate their society’s ethnic and cultural homogeneity over the European
norm of refugee protection.
My research has several limitations. First, data do not probe enough on people’s reasons
for not responding to the EU message and being more supportive of Syrian refugees to settle
in the country, but are more receptive of the EU message to allow them through their country
toward EU member countries. We offered some plausible explanations, but they should be
submitted to empirical scrutiny. Unfortunately, our data do not support such testing, and
additional data would help in such a direction. This remains a task for further research.
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